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Why does public conflict over societal risks persist in the face of compelling and widely accessible 
scientific evidence? We conducted an experiment to probe two alternative answers: the “Science 
Comprehension Thesis” (SCT), which identifies defects in the public’s knowledge and reasoning ca-
pacities as the source of such controversies; and the “Identity-protective Cognition Thesis” (ICT), 
which treats cultural conflict as disabling the faculties that members of the public use to make sense 
of decision-relevant science. In our experiment, we presented subjects with a difficult problem that 
turned on their ability to draw valid causal inferences from empirical data. As expected, subjects 
highest in numeracy—a measure of the ability and disposition to make use of quantitative infor-
mation—did substantially better than less numerate ones when the data were presented as results 
from a study of a new skin-rash treatment. Also as expected, subjects’ responses became politically 
polarized—and even less accurate—when the same data were presented as results from the study of 
a gun-control ban. But contrary to the prediction of SCT, such polarization did not abate among sub-
jects highest in numeracy; instead, it increased. This outcome supported ICT, which predicted that 
more Numerate subjects would use their quantitative-reasoning capacity selectively to conform their 
interpretation of the data to the result most consistent with their political outlooks. We discuss the 
theoretical and practical significance of these findings. 
 
1. Introduction 
Disputed empirical issues—ones that admit of 
investigation by scientific inquiry—occupy a con-
spicuous place in U.S. political life. Does consump-
tion of fossil fuel generate global warming? Can 
nuclear wastes be safely stored in deep geologic de-
positories? Will vaccinating adolescent girls against 
the human papilloma virus—the dominant cause of 
cervical cancer—lull them into engaging in unpro-
tected sex, thereby increasing their exposure to oth-
er sexually transmitted diseases? Does banning the 
possession of concealed weapons increase crime—
or decrease it? Will aggressive public spending limit 
the duration and severity of an economic reces-
sion—or compound them? Intense and often ran-
corous conflict on these issues persists despite the 
availability of compelling and widely accessible em-
pirical evidence (Kahan 2010). 
Such conflict casts doubt on the prospects for 
enlightened self-government. Collective welfare 
demands empirically informed collective action. To 
be sure, decision-relevant science rarely generates a 
unique solution to any policy dispute: Even after the 
basic facts have been established, what to do will 
involve judgments of value that will vary across citi-
zens who hold competing understandings of the 
public good. But unless citizens and their represent-
atives possess empirically sound understandings of 
the dangers they face and the likely effects of poli-
cies to abate them, they will not even be able to 
identify, much less secure enactment of, policies 
that advance their ends. 
Regardless of their political outlooks, then, all 
democratic citizens have a stake in dispelling persis-
tent public conflict over decision-relevant science. 
Satisfying this common interest itself demands em-
pirical study aimed at enlarging knowledge of why 
citizens of diverse outlooks disagree not just about 
what to do but about what is known to science. 
In this paper, we present the results of a study 
aimed at testing rival accounts of public controversy 
over decision-relevant science. We begin with a 
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brief overview of these two positions. We then de-
scribe the study and report the results. Finally, we 
offer an assessment of what the findings imply for 
future study of political conflict over policy-relevant 
facts and practical steps to dispel it. 
2. Polarization over decision-relevant 
science: two accounts 
As is the case with most interesting social phe-
nomena (Watts 2011), the number of plausible ex-
planations for persistent public controversy over 
risks and other policy-relevant facts exceeds the 
number that can actually be true. We identify two of 
the possibilities. 
The first one attributes such conflict to deficits 
in the public’s capacity to comprehend scientific 
evidence. The public, on this account, has a weak 
understanding of science (Miller & Pardo 2000). 
Ordinary citizens are thus liable to misunderstand 
what scientists are telling them and vulnerable to 
being misled by those trying to deceive them for 
private advantage (McCaffrey & Buhr 2008; 
Rosenau 2012). 
The public’s limited knowledge is aggravated by 
psychological dynamics. Popular risk perceptions, it 
is thought, tend to originate in a rapid, heuristic-
driven form of information processing—what deci-
sion scientists refer to as “System 1” reasoning 
(Stanovich & West 2000; Kahneman 2003). Overre-
liance on System 1 heuristics are the root of myriad 
cognitive biases. By fixing attention on emotionally 
gripping instances of harm, or by inducing selective 
attention to evidence that confirms rather than dis-
appoints moral predispositions, System 1 infor-
mation processing induces members of the public 
variously to overestimate some risks and underesti-
mate others relative to the best available evidence, 
the proper evaluation of which requires exercise of 
more deliberate and reflective “System 2” forms of 
information processing (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee 
& Welch 2001; Sunstein 2003; Marx, Weber, Or-
love, Leiserowitz, Krant, Roncoli & Phillips 2007; 
Weber 2006; Weber & Stern 2011).  
We will call this account the “Science Compre-
hension Thesis” (SCT). SCT is an extremely popular 
explanation for conflicts over climate change and 
various other disputed risks, particularly among 
commentators who construct secondary interpretive 
accounts by synthesizing diverse findings from deci-
sion science (Sunstein 2005, 2006, 2007). 
We will call the second account of persistent 
controversy over policy-relevant facts the “Identity-
protective Cognition Thesis” (ICT). ICT, in an im-
portant sense, stands SCT on its head. Whereas 
SCT attributes conflicts over decision-relevant sci-
ence to deficits in science comprehension, ICT sees 
the public’s otherwise intact capacity to compre-
hend decision-relevant science as disabled by cultur-
al and political conflict. 
 Individuals, on this account, have a large 
stake—psychically as well as materially—in main-
taining the status of, and their personal standing in, 
affinity groups whose members are bound by their 
commitment to shared moral understandings. If 
opposing positions on a policy-relevant fact—e.g., 
whether human activity is generating dangerous 
global warming—come to be seen as symbols of 
membership in and loyalty to competing groups of 
this kind, individuals can be expected to display a 
strong tendency to conform their understanding of 
whatever evidence they encounter to the position 
that prevails in theirs (McCright & Dunlap 2013; 
Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman 2011). A form of 
motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990), identity-
protective cognition can be viewed as a psychic self-
defense mechanism that steers individuals away 
from beliefs that could alienate them from others 
on whose support they depend in myriad domains 
of everyday life (Sherman & Cohen 2006; Giner-
Sorolla & Chaiken 1997). 
The conditions that trigger this sort of response 
are rare. Very few facts amenable to empirical inves-
tigation ever become symbols of group identity. The 
U.S. public is not polarized over the utility of anti-
biotics in treating bacterial infections, the health risk 
of cell phone radiation, the efficiencies associated 
with governmental provision of public safety ser-
vices such as fire and police protection, the disad-
vantages of relying on a system of bartering or pri-
vately guaranteed commercial paper rather than a 
common currency issued by and guaranteed by the 
government, etc. In the absence of divisive cultural 
conflict, citizens of all levels of science comprehen-
sion generally form positions consistent with the 
best available evidence. Moreover, there is every 
reason to believe in such circumstances that those 
who enjoy higher than average capacities for science 
comprehension use those capacities to make even 
better science-informed decisions. 
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But when a policy-relevant fact does become 
suffused with culturally divisive meanings, the pres-
sure to form group-congruent beliefs will often 
dominate whatever incentives individuals have to 
“get the right answer” from an empirical standpoint. 
On matters like climate change, nuclear waste dis-
posal, the financing of economic stimulus programs, 
and the like, an ordinary citizen pays no price for 
forming a perception of fact that is contrary to the 
best available empirical evidence: That individual’s 
personal beliefs and related actions—as consumer, 
voter, or public discussant—are too inconsequential 
to affect the level of risk he or anyone else faces or 
the outcome of any public policy debate. However, 
if he gets the ‘wrong answer” in relation to the one 
that is expected of members of his affinity group, 
the impact could be devastating: the loss of trust 
among peers, stigmatization within his community, 
and even the loss of economic opportunities (Ka-
han 2012). 
Thus, at one level—a very individualistic one—
it will make perfect sense in this situation for indi-
viduals to attend to information, including evidence 
of what is known to science, that promotes the 
formation of identity-congruent beliefs. Again, even 
citizens of modest science literacy and critical rea-
soning skills will likely be able to form such beliefs 
without difficulty—because figuring out what view 
prevails among those with whom one shares one’s 
most important connections depends on a basic 
kind of cultural competence, not on an understand-
ing of or a facility with empirical evidence. But 
those citizens who enjoy above-average science 
comprehension will not face any less incentive to 
form such beliefs; indeed, they will face pressure to 
use their intelligence and reasoning skills to find 
evidentiary support for identity-congruent beliefs 
the comprehension of which would likely exceed 
the capacity of most of their peers (Kahan et al. 
2012). 
At a collective level, of course, this style of en-
gaging decision-relevant science can be disastrous. 
If all individuals follow it at the same time, it will 
impede a democratic society from converging, or at 
least converging as quick as it otherwise would, on 
understandings of fact consistent with the best 
available evidence on matters that affect their com-
mon welfare. This outcome, however, will not 
change the incentive of any individual—who despite 
the harm he or she suffers as a result of un-
addressed risks or ill-considered policies cannot 
change the course of public policymaking by chang-
ing his or her personal stances, which, if contrary to 
the ones that prevail in that person’s group, will 
continue to expose him or her to considerable social 
disadvantage. 
ICT thus sees a particular species of group 
competition as subversive of the disposition demo-
cratic citizens to use their capacities to comprehend 
decision-relevant science—or at least to use them in 
ways that ordinarily steer them toward convergence 
on the best available evidence. Persistent conflict 
over risks and other policy-relevant facts reflects a 
“tragedy of the science communications commons”: 
a misalignment between the individual interests that 
culturally diverse citizens have in forming beliefs 
that connect them to others who share their distinc-
tive understanding of the best life and the collective 
interest that members of all such groups share in 
the enactment of public policies that enable them to 
pursue their ends free from threats to their health 
and prosperity (Kahan et al. 2012; Kahan 2013). 
3. Study design and hypotheses 
3.1. Overview 
We undertook a study to test SCT and ICT. 
The study involved drawing inferences from data 
generated by a fictional experiment. Both the focus 
of the experiment—the effectiveness of a new skin-
rash treatment and the effectiveness of a ban on 
carrying concealed weapons in public—and its out-
come were manipulated. By enabling us to examine 
whether the subjects’ ability to correctly interpret 
the data would vary only in relation to their profi-
ciency in quantitative reasoning or vary as well in 
relation to the ideological congeniality of the exper-
iment results, this design effectively pitted SCT and 
ICT against one another. 
3.2. Sample 
The subjects for the study consisted of a na-
tionally diverse sample of 1111 U.S. adults. The 
subjects were recruited to participate by Po-
limetrix/YouGov, which administered the study via 
that firm’s on-line testing facilities. The sample was 
52% female, and the mean age of the subjects was 
48 years. Seventy-three percent of the subjects were 
white, and 11% African-American. Twenty-eight 
percent of the sample self-identified as Republican, 
36% as Democrat, and 30% independent. Twenty-
six percent identified themselves as either “Liberal  
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Figure 1. Numeracy scores. Bars denote density distribution of scores on Numeracy scale. 
 
or “very Liberal”: 38% as “Conservative” or “very 
Conservative”; and 27% as “Moderate.” The mean 
education level was “some college”; the mean annu-
al income was $40,000 to $49,000. The study was 
administered over a period from late April to mid-
May, 2013. 
3.3. Individual characteristic measures 
Subjects furnished standard demographic data, 
including political affiliations and outlooks. Party 
self-identification (“dem_repub”) was measured 
with a seven-point Likert item (“Strong Democrat, 
Democrat, Independent Lean Democrat, Independ-
ent, Independent Lean Republican, Republican, 
Strong Republican”). Political ideology (“libcon”) 
was measured with a five-point Likert item (“Very 
liberal”; “Liberal”; “Moderate”: “Conservative”; 
“Very Conservative”). Responses to these two items 
formed a reliable aggregate Likert scale (α = 0.83), 
which was labeled “Conserv_Repub” and trans-
formed into a -score to facilitate interpretation 
(Smith 2000). 
The right-left political orientation measured by 
Conserv_Repub is a familiar representation of the 
basis on which the public is divided on many issues 
turning on decision-relevant science. More im-
portantly, it is one indicator of the latent group af-
finities of the sort that can be expected to generate 
motivated reasoning.1 
We also measured the subjects’ numeracy. A 
well-established and highly studied construct, nu-
meracy encompasses not just mathematical ability 
                                                     
1 It is not the only measure of these dispositions, of course, and 
not necessarily the most discerning one (Kahan et al. 2012). An 
alternative that we have used in previous studies of the “cultural 
cognition of risk” (Kahan 2012) features “cultural worldviews” 
assessed along two orthogonal dimensions (“hierarchy-
egalitarianism” and “individualism-communitarianism”). “Cul-
tural cognition,” in this work, is simply the term used to desig-
nate the species of identity-protective cognition that accounts 
for a wide variety of risk-controversies (Kahan 2011). Most of 
the controversies involving environmental and technological 
risks (but not for many others that feature public-health risks 
(e.g., Kahan, Braman, Monohan, Callahan & Peters 2010) fea-
ture controversy between individuals whose values are more 
hierarchical and individualistic, on the one hand, and others 
who are more egalitarian and communitarian, on the other. So 
does the controversy over gun risks (Kahan et al 2007; Gastil et 
al. 2011). The former tend to be more “conservative” and “Re-
publican,” the latter more “liberal” and “Democratic,” although 
individuals with strong worldviews orientations of this sort are 
not in fact highly partisan (Kahan et al., 2012). For accessibility 
and to promote commensurability between our results and 
those of researchers who tend to use “right-left” political out-
look measures, we use liberal-conservative ideology and parti-
san self-identification measures in this paper. As is true in other 
studies examining conflicts (Kahan et al. 2012; Kahan, June 21, 
2012; Kahan, Dec. 9, 2012), an analysis of the data using the 
cultural worldview measures generates results that are the same 
in nature but even more dramatic in their effects. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
numeracy
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
numeracyNumeracy score
Entire Sample
Numeracy score
Political outlook subsamples
Conserv_Repub > 0Conserv_Repub < 0
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but also a disposition to engage quantitative infor-
mation in a reflective and systematic way and use it 
to support valid inferences (Peters, Västfjäll, Slovic, 
Mertz, Maocco & Dickert 2006; Liberali et al. Pardo 
2011).   
We assessed the numeracy of our subjects with 
a battery of world problems conventionally used for 
this purpose (Weller et al. 2012). The mean number 
of correct responses was 3.7 (SD = 2.1). The distri-
bution of scores was essentially normal (kurtosis = 
2.6), a result consistent with previous studies aimed 
at constructing a scale that could be expected to 
measure variation across the entire range of the la-
tent capacity measured by the Numeracy scale (α = 
0.74). Subjects who scored above the mean on Con-
serv_Repub scored slightly higher than those who 
scored below the mean (ΔM = 0.3, t = 2.44, p = 
0.02). 
3.4. Stimulus 
The stimulus consisted of four versions of a 
problem involving interpretation of data and causal 
inference. The problem described an experiment 
and the observed results (Figure 2). Those results 
were reported in a two-by-two contingency table, 
the columns of which specified the number of cases 
that reflected positive and negative results, respec-
tively, and the rows of which reflected the experi-
mental treatment. 
 
Figure 2. Stimulus from “rash increases” condition. Subjects were advised that researchers had conducted an experiment to de-
termine whether a new skin-treatment treatment was effective or instead had adverse effects. The results were summarized in a 2x2 
contingency table, and the subjects were then instructed to determine whether the experiment showed that the skin condition of peo-
ple treated with the cream was more likely to “get better” or “get worse.” 
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Two of the versions of the experiment involved 
a skin-rash treatment. In these versions, subjects 
were advised that “[m]edical researchers have de-
veloped a new cream for treating skin rashes.” They 
were also advised that “[n]ew treatments often work 
but sometimes make rashes worse,” and “skin rash-
es sometimes get better and sometimes get worse 
on their own” whether or not a person is treated. 
To determine the effect of the new treatment, ex-
perimenters (the subjects were told) had divided a 
number of patients suffering skin rashes into two 
groups—one that was administered the skin cream, 
and another that was not—and then observed in 
how many the skin condition improved and how 
many it got worse after a two-week trial period. 
Based on the results, as reflected in the 2x2 contin-
gency table, subjects were instructed to indicate 
whether the “[p]eople who used the skin cream 
were more likely to get better than those who 
didn’t” or instead “People who used the skin cream 
were more likely to get worse than those who 
didn’t.” 
The two versions of the skin-treatment treat-
ment problem differed only with respect to which 
result the experiment supported. The numbers in 
the 2x2 contingency table were kept the same, but 
the labels at the tops of the columns—“Rash got 
better” and “Rash got worse”—were manipulated 
(Figure 3). 
Correctly interpreting the data was expected to 
be difficult. Doing so requires assessing not just the 
absolute number of subjects who experienced posi-
tive outcomes (“rash better”) and negative ones 
(“rash worse”) in either or both conditions but ra-
ther comparing the ratio of those who experienced 
a positive outcome to those who experienced a neg-
ative one in each condition. Comparing these ratios 
is essential to detecting covariance between the 
treatment and the two outcomes, a necessary ele-
ment of causal inference that confounds even many 
intelligent people (Stanovich 2009; Stanovich & 
West 1998). 
Based on previous studies using the design re-
flected in this experiment, it is known that most 
people use one of two heuristic alternatives to this 
approach. The first involves comparing the number 
of outcomes in the upper left cell to the number in 
the upper right one (“1 vs. 2”). The other (“1 vs. 3”) 
involves comparing the numbers in the upper left 
and lower left cells (Wasserman, Dorner & Kao 
1990). 
 
 
Figure 3. Experimental conditions. Subjects were assigned to one of four conditions. The conditions are identified by labels 
(A)-(D) in a manner that indicates the result or outcome of the experiment that is most supported by the data contained in the rele-
vant table. The correct interpretation of the data was manipulated by varying the result specified by the headings above the columns. 
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Each of these heuristic strategies generates a 
recognizable species of invalid causal inference. “1 
vs. 2” amounts to assessing a treatment without 
considering information from a control. “1 vs. 3” 
compares outcomes in the treatment and control 
but in a manner that neglects to consult information 
necessary to disentangle the impact of the treatment 
from other influences at work in both conditions.  
In the real world, of course, use of either of 
these defective strategies—both of which amount 
to failing to use all the information necessary to 
make a valid causal inference—might still generate 
the correct answer. But for our study stimulus, the 
numbers for the cells of the contingency table were 
deliberately selected so that use of either heuristic 
strategy would generate an incorrect interpretation 
of the results of the fictional skin-treatment experi-
ment.  
The second two versions of the experiment in-
volved a gun-control measure (Figure 3). Subjects 
were instructed that a “city government was trying 
to decide whether to pass a law banning private citi-
zens from carrying concealed handguns in public.” 
Government officials, subjects were told, were “un-
sure whether the law will be more likely to decrease 
crime by reducing the number of people carrying 
weapons or increase crime by making it harder for 
law-abiding citizens to defend themselves from vio-
lent criminals.” To address this question, research-
ers had divided cities into two groups: one consist-
ing of cities that had recently enacted bans on con-
cealed weapons and another that had no such bans. 
They then observed the number of cities that expe-
rienced “decreases in crime” and those that experi-
enced “increases in crime” in the next year. Sup-
plied that information once more in a 2x2 contin-
gency table, subjects were instructed to indicate 
whether “cities that enacted a ban on carrying con-
cealed handguns were more likely to have a decrease 
in crime” or instead “more likely to have an increase 
in crime than cities without bans.” The column 
headings on the 2x2 table were again manipulated, 
generating one version in which the data, properly 
interpreted, supported the conclusion that cities 
banning guns were more likely to experience in-
creased crime relative to those that had not, and 
another version in which cities banning guns were 
more likely to experience decreased crime. 
Overall, then, there were four experimental 
conditions—ones reflecting opposite experiment 
results for both the skin-treatment version of the 
problem and the gun-ban version. The design was a 
between-subjects ones, in which individuals were 
assigned to only one of these conditions. For sake 
of expository convenience, we will refer to the con-
ditions as “rash decrease,” “rash increase,” “crime 
decrease,” and “crime increase,” with the label de-
scribing the result that a correct interpretation of 
the 2x2 contingency table would most support. 
3.5. Hypotheses 
We formed three hypotheses. The first was that 
subjects high in numeracy would be more likely to 
get the right result in both skin-treatment condi-
tions.  
This hypothesis reflected results in previous 
studies. As indicated, such studies show that the 
covariance-detection problem featured in this ex-
periment is very difficult for most people to answer 
correctly (Stanovich 2009). 
One recent study, however, shows that the like-
lihood of answering the problem correctly is pre-
dicted by an individual’s score on the Cognitive Re-
flection Test (Toplak, West & Stanovich 2011). The 
CRT features a set of problems, each of which is 
designed to prompt an immediate and intuitively 
compelling response that is in fact incorrect. Be-
cause supplying the correct answer requires con-
sciously stifling this intuition and logically deducing 
the right response, the CRT is understood to meas-
ure the disposition to use the slower, deliberate 
form of information-processing associated with 
System 2, as opposed to the rapid, heuristic-driven 
form associated with System 1. 
The CRT requires elementary mathematical 
skills, but is not a numeracy test per se (Liberali, 
Reyna, Furlan, Stein & Pardo 2012). However, inso-
far as making valid causal inferences in the covari-
ance-detection problem likewise demands suppress-
ing the heuristic tendency to give decisive signifi-
cance to suggestive but incomplete portions of the 
information reflected in the 2x2 contingency table, 
it is not surprising that individuals who score higher 
on CRT are more likely to correctly interpret the 
data the table contains. 
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We would expect the numeracy scale to be an 
even stronger predictor of how likely a person is to 
select the correct response in the skin-treatment 
versions of this problem. Like the CRT, the numer-
acy scale measures a disposition to subject intuition 
to critical interrogation in light of all available in-
formation—and thus to avoid mistakes characteris-
tic of over-reliance on heuristic, System 1 infor-
mation processing (Liberali et al. 2012). Indeed, two 
CRT items are conventionally included in the nu-
meracy scale (Weller et al. 2012), and we added the 
third in this study in order to reinforce its sensitivity 
to the disposition to preempt reliance on unverified 
intuition. However, whereas the CRT measures the 
disposition to use System 2 information processing 
generally, the numeracy scale measures how profi-
cient individuals are in using it to reason with quan-
titative information in particular, a capacity specifi-
cally relevant to the covariance-detection problem 
featured in the stimulus.  
The hypothesis that performance in the skin-
treatment conditions would be positively correlated 
with numeracy was common to SCT and ICT. The 
second and third hypotheses reflect opposing SCT 
and ICT predictions relating to results in the gun-
ban conditions. 
Whereas the issue in the skin-treatment ver-
sions of the covariance-detection problem—does a 
new skin cream improve or aggravate a common-
place and nonserious medical condition—is devoid 
of partisan significance, the question whether a gun 
ban increases or instead decreases crime is a high 
profile political one that provokes intense debate. 
Consistent with the growing literature on culturally 
or ideologically motivated reasoning (Jost, Hennes 
& Lavine in press), we anticipated that subjects in 
the gun-ban conditions would be more likely to 
construe the data as consistent with the position 
that prevails among persons who share their politi-
cal outlooks—regardless of which version of the 
problem (“crime increases” or “crime decreases”) 
they were assigned. Specifically, we surmised that  
gratification of the interest subjects would have in 
confirmation of their predispositions would rein-
force their tendency to engage in heuristic reasoning 
when subjects were assigned to the condition in 
which “1 vs. 2” or “1 vs. 3” generated a mistaken 
answer that was nonetheless congenial to their polit-
ical outlooks. That ideologically motivated reason-
ing would compound heuristic reasoning in this way 
was specifically supported by studies showing that 
an existing position on a contested nonpolitical is-
sue (Dawson & Gilovich 2000), aversion to threat-
ening information (Dawson, Gilovich & Regan 
2002), and prior beliefs (Stanovich & West 1998) 
can all magnify the sorts of reasoning errors fre-
quently encountered in covariance-detection prob-
lems identical or closely related to the one featured 
in our stimulus.  
But in whom should motivated cognition inter-
fere with reasoning in this way and by how much?  
SCT understands persistent controversy over risk 
and like facts to reflect a deficit in science compre-
hension, of which the capacities measured by the 
numeracy scale are important elements. Based on 
SCT, then, it seems reasonable to predict that the 
degree of ideological polarization expected to be 
observed in the gun-ban conditions would abate as 
subjects become higher in numeracy. Such a predic-
tion would be consistent, too, with the position, 
advanced by many scholars, that ideologically moti-
vated cognition is itself best understood as a form 
of the heuristic-driven information processing char-
acteristic of System 1 reasoning (Lodge & Taber 
2013; Sunstein, 2006; Marx et al. 2007; Westen al. 
2006; Weber & Stern 2011). If so, one might expect 
numeracy, as a capacity that demands the form of 
conscious reflection associated with System 2, to 
preempt motivated reasoning that most people 
bring to bear on the covariance-detection problem. 
The second hypothesis, then, was that subjects 
higher in numeracy would be more likely to con-
strue the data correctly not only when it was con-
sistent with their ideological predispositions but also 
when it was inconsistent with them and thus likely 
to display less ideological polarization than subjects 
lower in numeracy. 
ICT generates a different prediction based on a 
different understanding of the source of public con-
flict over decision-relevant science. ICT views ideo-
logically motivated reasoning as a form of identity 
self-defense that reliably protects individuals interest 
by guiding them to construe evidence in a manner 
that enables them to persist in culturally congenial 
or identity-affirming beliefs. Persistent political po-
larization over policy-relevant facts that admit of 
empirical study is not a consequence of any deficit 
in science comprehension but rather a consequence 
of the disabling impact of symbolic status competi-
tion on the disposition of individuals to use their 
ability to comprehend science in a manner geared to 
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producing evidence-congruent beliefs (Kahan et al. 
2006). 
On this account, we should not expect the de-
gree of ideological polarization likely to characterize 
subjects’ responses in the gun-ban conditions to 
diminish with numeracy. Indeed, the third hypothe-
sis, one that is associated with ICT but not SCT, is 
that ideological polarization in the gun-ban condi-
tions should be most extreme among those highest 
in numeracy. 
Individuals high in science comprehension have 
a special resource to engage evidence in a manner 
calculated to generate ideological congenial conclu-
sions. Because the causal-inference problem fea-
tured in this study is genuinely difficult, it makes 
sense to expect subjects to resort to such reasoning 
when assigned to the condition (“crime decreases” 
for “liberal Democrats” and “crime increases” for 
conservative Republicans”) in which less effortful 
heuristic engagement with the provided information 
would generate an identity-threatening conclusion 
for persons with their political outlooks. But those 
low in numeracy will be less likely to succeed in dis-
cerning the correct, identity-affirming conclusion 
that the data in that condition actually supports, 
because they are less likely to possess the sorts of 
science-comprehension capacities that doing so re-
quires. 
At the same time, ICT predicts that high Nu-
merate subjects should not be substantially more 
likely to correctly interpret the data than low nu-
meracy ones when assigned to the condition that 
presents identity-threatening information (“crime 
increases” for “liberal Democrats” and “crime de-
creases” for conservative Republicans”). Engaging 
in the form of intensive reflection associated with 
System 2 is cognitively taxing; it is something we 
should expect individuals to resort to only when 
they themselves are likely to recognize (consciously 
or otherwise) some advantage in using it. Thus, 
where less effortful, heuristic engagement with the 
information in the gun-ban conditions generates an 
identity-affirming conclusion, ICT predicts that high 
numeracy subjects will “settle” for heuristic reason-
ing, and end up with the wrong interpretation of the 
data, just as their low numeracy counterparts will 
(Kahan 2013). 
If high numeracy subjects use their special cog-
nitive advantage selectively—only when doing so 
generates an ideological congenial answer but not 
otherwise—they will end up even more polarized 
than their low numeracy counterparts. Such a result, 
while highly counterintuitive from the perspective 
of SCT, would be consistent with the view of a 
smaller group of scholars who take the view that 
identity-protective cognition operates on both heu-
ristic and systematic—System 1 and System 2—
forms of information processing (Cohen 2003; 
Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken 1997;  Chen, Duckworth 
& Chaiken 1999; Kahan 2013). It would also be 
consistent with, and help to explain, results from 
observational studies showing that the most science 
comprehending citizens are the most polarized on 
issues like climate change and nuclear power (Ka-
han et al. 2012; Hamilton 2012). 
4. Results 
4.1 Preliminary analyses 
No matter what condition subjects were as-
signed to, they were highly likely to select the wrong 
response to the covariance-detection problem. 
Overall, 59% of the subjects supplied the incorrect 
answer—identifying as the most supported result 
the one that was in fact least supported by the in-
formation in the 2x2 contingency table.  
Figure 4. Scatter plot of responses in skin-treatment con-
ditions. Red circles identify subjects assigned to the “rash in-
creases” condition, black ones to the “rash decreases” condi-
tion. Locally weighted regression lines (Cohen et al. 2003) track 
the proportion of subjects answering the problem correctly in 
relation to numeracy levels in the  two skin-treatment condi-
tions. 
Figure 4 presents a scatter plot of subject re-
sponses in the skin-treatment conditions. It supplies 
strong support for the first hypothesis—that the 
likelihood of correctly interpreting the data in the 
skin-treatment conditions would be conditional on 
numeracy. Reflecting, the difficulty of the task, sub-
jects of low and even moderate numeracy scores 
were more likely than not to select the wrong an-
swer in both “rash decreases” and “rash increases.” 
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Even among those scoring in the top 50% on the 
numeracy scale (4 or more answers correct), less 
than half (48%) supplied the correct answer. It was 
not until scores on the numeracy scale reached 90th 
percentile or above (7-9 correct) that 75% of the 
subjects correctly identified the result most sup-
ported by the data in the 2x2 contingency table. 
Figure 5. Scatter plot of responses in gun-ban conditions. 
Red circles identify subjects assigned to the “crime increases” 
condition, black ones to the “crime decreases” condition. Lo-
cally weighted regression lines (Cohen et al. 2003) track the 
proportion of subjects answering the problem correctly in rela-
tion to numeracy levels in the two gun-control conditions. 
Figure 5 presents a scatter plot of subject re-
sponses in the gun-control condition. The pattern 
differs from that in the skin-treatment conditions. 
The impact of numeracy on performance in the 
“crime increases” condition is minimal. The propor-
tion of subjects correctly interpreting the data did 
increase as numeracy increased in the “crime de-
crease” condition, but even at the highest levels of 
numeracy, the percentage of subjects who supplied 
the incorrect response in that condition was rela-
tively high. Overall, even among subjects in the 90th 
percentile, only 57% of those assigned to one of the 
gun-control conditions correctly identified the out-
come most supported by the data. The discrepancy 
is consistent with the inference that a factor present 
in the gun-control conditions but not in the skin-
treatment ones inhibits the contribution numeracy 
makes to identifying the correct answer.  
Figure 6 plots responses for all four conditions 
among subjects of opposing political outlooks. Vis-
ual inspection demonstrates no meaningful variation 
among “Liberal Democrats” (subjects scoring below 
the mean on Conserv_Repub) and “Conservative 
Republicans” (ones scoring above the mean) in the 
skin-rash conditions. For both groups, the relation-
ship between identifying the result genuinely sup-
ported by the data and numeracy displays the same 
pattern observed in the sample as a whole.  
Visual inspection suggests a clear interaction 
between numeracy and political outlooks, however, 
in the gun-ban conditions (Figure 6). Liberal Dem-
ocrats become increasingly likely to correctly identi-
fy the result supported by the data as they become 
more numerate in the “crime decreases” condition; 
but increasing numeracy had minimal impact for 
Liberal Democrats in the “crime increases” condi-
tion. Among Conservative Republicans, the pattern 
was inverted: the impact of higher numeracy on 
subjects’ ability to supply the correct answer was 
substantially larger in the “crime increases “condi-
tion than in the “crime decreases” one.  
In other words, higher numeracy improved sub-
jects’ performance in detecting covariance only in 
the “gun control” condition in which the correct 
response was congenial to the subjects’ political 
outlooks. This result is inconsistent with the second, 
SCT hypothesis, which predicted that political po-
larization—of the form clearly apparent at low and 
middle levels of numeracy—would abate at higher 
levels. 
Indeed, visual inspection suggests that polariza-
tion—as measured by the gap between subjects of 
opposing political outlooks assigned to the same 
experimental condition—was greatest among sub-
jects highest in numeracy. Such a result would fit 
the third, ICT hypothesis, which predicted that sub-
jects capable of correctly interpreting the data 
would resort to the form of effortful, System 2 pro-
cessing necessary to do so only when the less effort-
ful, heuristic or System 1 assessment of the data 
threatened their ideological identities. 
4.2. Multivariate analyses 
In order to perform a more exacting test of the 
study hypothesis, a multivariate regression model 
was fit to the data.  Described in more detail in the 
technical appendix, the regression model contained 
predictors for subjects’ political outlooks and nu-
meracy and for the experimental condition to which 
they were assigned. 
Consistent with visual inspection of the raw da-
ta, the results of this analysis confirm that higher 
numeracy increases the probability that subjects will 
correctly interpret the results in the skin-treatment 
conditions. The results also suggest that less numer-
ate subjects are more likely to correctly interpret the 
data in the “rash decreases” condition than in the 
“rash increases” condition, but by an amount that is  
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Figure 6. Responses by subjects of opposing cultural outlooks. Locally weighted regression lines (Cohen et al. 2003) track 
the proportion of subjects answering the problem correctly in relation to numeracy levels in the various conditions. Blue 
lines plot relationship for subjects who score below the mean and red ones for subjects who score above the mean on Con-
serv_Repub, the composite measure based on liberal-conservative ideology and identification with one or the other major party. Solid 
lines are used for subjects in the condition which the data, properly interpreted support the inference that either skin rashes or crime 
decreased; dashed lines are used for subjects in conditions in which the data, properly interpreted, support the inference that either 
skin rashes or crime increased. 
 
modest in size and nonsignificant (9% ± 14%, 
LC = 0.95). 
Such outcomes are illustrated in Figure 7. Gen-
erated by Monte Carlo Simulation, the density plots 
illustrate the estimated probability of correctly in-
terpreting the data, and the precision of that esti-
mate, for a low-numeracy (3 correct) and a high-
numeracy (7 correct) “liberal Democrat” (-1 SD on 
Conserv_Repub) and for a low-numeracy and a 
high-numeracy “conservative Republican” (+1 SD) 
in each experimental condition (King, et al. 2000). 
Figure 7 also strongly disconfirms the second, 
SCT hypothesis. A low-numeracy Liberal Democrat 
is more likely to correctly identify the outcome sup-
ported by the data than is a low-numeracy Con-
servative Republican when the data, in fact, sup 
Numeracy score
crime decreases
crime increases
crime decreases
crime increases
rash decreases
rash increases
rash decreases
rash increases
Numeracy scoreNumeracy score
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Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of correctly interpreting data. Density distributions derived via Monte Carlo simulation from 
regression Model 3, Table 1, when predictors for Conserv_Repub set at -1 SD and +1 SD for “Liberal Democrat” and “Conservative 
Republican,” respectively, and numeracy set at 3 and 7 for “low numeracy” and for High numeracy, respectively (King, Tom & Wit-
tenberg 2000). 
 
ports the conclusion that a gun ban decreases crime, 
but is less likely to correctly identify the outcome 
when the data supports the conclusion that a gun 
ban increases crime. This pattern of polarization, con-
trary to the SCT hypothesis, does not abate among 
high-numeracy subjects. 
Indeed, it increases. On average, the high numer-
acy partisan whose political outlooks were affirmed 
by the data, properly interpreted, was 45 percentage 
points more likely (± 14, LC = 0.95) to identify the 
conclusion actually supported by the gun-ban exper-
iment than was the high numeracy partisan whose 
political outlooks were affirmed by selecting the 
incorrect response. The average difference in the 
case of low numeracy partisans was 25 percentage 
points (± 10)—a difference of 20 percentage points 
(± 16).  Corroborating the inference that this effect 
was attributable to ideologically motivated reason-
ing, there were no meaningful or significant partisan 
differences among high-numeracy subjects—or 
low-numeracy ones, for that matter—in the skin-
treatment conditions (Figure 8). These findings sup-
port the third, ITC hypothesis. 
The reason that numeracy amplified polariza-
tion, these analyses illustrate, was that high numera-
cy partisans were more likely than low numeracy 
ones to identify the correct response to the covari-
ance-detection problem when doing so affirmed 
subjects’ political outlooks. A high-numeracy Con-
servative Republican, the model predicted, was 21 
percentage points (± 16) more likely than a low-
numeracy one to recognize the correct result in the 
“crime increases” condition; in the “crime decreas-
es” condition, a high-numeracy Liberal Democrat 
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was 32 percentage points (± 20) more likely than a 
low-numeracy one to identify the correct response.  
But when the data, correctly interpreted, threatened 
subjects outlooks, high-numeracy partisans enjoyed 
no meaningful advantage over their low-numeracy 
counterparts (3 percentage points, ± 16, for Con-
servative Republicans in “crime decreases”; 11 per-
centage points, ± 20, for Liberal Democrats in 
“crime increases”), all of whom were unlikely to 
identify the correct response (Figure 7). 
This pattern is also consistent with ITC.  ITC 
predicts that where an individual has an identity-
protective stake in a particular outcome, he or she 
will resort to effortful, System 2 processing—of the 
sort needed to draw valid inferences from complex 
data—only when less effortful heuristic reasoning 
generates a conclusion that threatens his or her 
identity. Here, high-numeracy subjects in the gun-
ban conditions were likely to terminate their en-
gagement with the evidence when heuristic assess-
ment of it gratified their political predispositions—
even though the resulting inference that they drew 
about the result of the experiment was incorrect. 
At the same time, the source of the contribu-
tion that numeracy makes to enlarging polarization 
in the gun-control conditions also helps to address 
the question whether subjects of all levels of nu-
meracy were construing the data in a reflexively or 
automatically partisan fashion without making any 
effort to engage it. This interpretation is not con-
sistent with the data. If this were happening, low-
numeracy partisans would have done just as well as 
high-numeracy ones when assigned to the condition 
in which a correct response was affirming of their 
identities. 
 
Figure 8. Predicted differences in probability that partisans will correctly interpret the data. Predicted differences in probabili-
ties derived via Monte Carlo simulation from regression Model 3, Table 1. Predictors for Conserv_Repub set at -1 SD and +1 SD for 
“Liberal Democrat” and “Conservative Republican,” respectively, and numeracy set at 3 and 7 for “low numeracy” and for High nu-
meracy, respectively. CIs indicate 0.95 level of confidence. 
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In this particular context, then, accurately discern-
ing the identity-affirming outcome depended on a 
high degree of numeracy. It was the selective exer-
cise of the special capacity that higher numeracy 
confers in this regard that aggravated partisan polar-
ization among high-numeracy subjects.  
The regression analysis also identified one addi-
tional main effect. Even after accounting for the 
effects of political outlooks and numeracy, being 
assigned to “crime increases” as opposed to the 
“crime decreases” condition substantially improved 
subject performance in the covariance-detection 
problem (Table A1, Model 3). The size of the effect 
(b = 1.07,  = 4.02, p < 0.01) is equivalent to a 26 
percentage-point increase (± 12), which can be in-
terpreted as how much more likely an individual of 
mean political outlooks and mean numeracy would 
be to identify the correct result in the “crime in-
creases” condition than his or her counterpart in the 
“crime decreases” condition.  
This outcome was not anticipated. But insofar 
as previous research on the ability to detect covari-
ance has shown that confirmation bias can magnify 
the tendency of subjects to rely decisively, and mis-
takenly, on a heuristic strategy (Stanovich & West 
1998), this result can plausibly be viewed as suggest-
ing the presence of a strong expectation among a 
large proportion of subjects of diverse political out-
looks that the gun ban would be ineffective. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Summary of principal results 
The experiment that was the subject of this pa-
per was designed to test two opposing accounts of 
conflict over decision-relevant science. The first—
the Science Comprehension Thesis (“SCT”)—
attributes such conflicts to the limited capacity of 
the public to understand the significance of valid 
empirical evidence. The second—the Identity-
protective Cognition Thesis (“ICT”)—sees a partic-
ular recurring form of group conflict as disabling the 
capacities that individuals have to make sense of 
decision-relevant science: when policy-relevant facts 
become identified as symbols of membership in and 
loyalty to affinity groups that figure in important 
ways in individuals’ lives, they will be motivated to 
engage empirical evidence and other information in 
a manner that more reliably connects their beliefs to 
the positions that predominate in their particular 
groups than to the positions that are best supported 
by the evidence. 
Study subjects were assigned to analyze the re-
sults of an experiment. Correctly interpreting the 
data required subjects to engage in a form of quanti-
tative analysis—identifying covariance between ex-
perimental treatment and outcomes—that is essen-
tial to valid causal inference but that many people 
have difficulty performing reliably and accurately. 
Not surprisingly, we found that when the experi-
ment was styled as one involving a skin-rash treat-
ment, the subjects’ probability of identifying the 
most supported outcome was highly sensitive to 
subjects’ numeracy, a capacity to understand and 
make proper use of quantitative information in rea-
soning tasks. 
Also not surprisingly—given the growing litera-
ture on ideologically motivated reasoning—subjects’ 
likelihood of correctly identifying the correct re-
sponse varied in relation to the subjects’ political 
outlooks when the experiment was styled as one 
involving a gun-control ban. Subjects were more 
likely to correctly identify the result most supported 
by the data when doing so affirmed the position one 
would expect them to be politically predisposed to 
accept—that the ban decreased crime, in the case of 
more liberal subjects who identify with the Demo-
cratic Party; and that it increased crime, in the case 
of more conservative ones who identify with Re-
publicans—than when the correct interpretation of 
the data threatened or disappointed their predispo-
sitions. 
SCT predicted that polarization among high-
numeracy partisans would be lower, however, than 
among low-numeracy ones in the gun-ban condi-
tions, consistent with the premise that political con-
flict over decision-relevant science is fed by defects 
in the capacity of ordinary members of the public to 
make sense of empirical evidence. The data did not 
support this prediction. 
On the contrary, numeracy magnified political 
polarization among high numeracy partisans. This 
result was consistent with ICT. 
More numerate individuals are benefitted by 
forming identity-congruent beliefs just as much as 
less numerate individuals are, and harmed just as 
much from forming identity-noncongruent beliefs. 
But more numerate individuals have a cognitive 
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ability that lower numeracy ones do not. ICT pre-
dicts that more numerate individuals will use that 
ability opportunistically in a manner geared to pro-
moting their interest in forming and persisting in 
identity-protective beliefs. 
 The results in the experiment suggest that 
high-numeracy partisans did exactly that in the gun-
ban conditions. Where reliance on low-effort heu-
ristic reasoning suggested an inference that was af-
firming of their political outlooks, high numeracy 
partisans selected the answer that reflected that 
mode of information processing—even though it 
generated the wrong answer. But where reliance on 
low-effort heuristic process suggested an inference 
that was threatening to their outlooks, high-
numeracy partisans used the ability that they but not 
their low-numeracy counterparts possessed to make 
proper use of all the quantitative information pre-
sented in a manner that generated a correct, identity-
affirming conclusion. This selectivity of their use of 
their greater capacity to draw inferences from quan-
titative information is what generated greater polari-
zation among high-numeracy partisans than low-
numeracy ones. 
5.2. Ideologically motivated cognition and dual process 
reasoning generally 
The ICT hypothesis corroborated by the exper-
iment in this paper conceptualizes numeracy as a 
capacity associated with the disposition to engage in 
deliberate, effortful System 2 reasoning as applied to 
quantitative information. The results of the experi-
ment thus help to deepen insight into the ongoing 
exploration of how ideologically motivated reason-
ing interacts with System 2 information processing 
generally. 
As suggested, dual process reasoning theories 
typically posit two forms of information processing: 
a “fast, associative” one “based on low-effort heu-
ristics”, and a “slow, rule based” one that relies on 
“high-effort systematic reasoning” (Chaiken & 
Trope 1999, p. ix). Some researchers have assumed 
(not unreasonably) that ideologically motivated cog-
nition—the tendency selectively to credit or discred-
it information in patterns that gratify one’s political 
or cultural predispositions—reflects over-reliance 
on the heuristic forms of information processing 
associated with heuristic-driven, System 1 style of 
information processing (e.g., Lodge & Taber 2013; 
Marx et al. 2007; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & 
Hamann, 2006; Weber & Stern 2011; Sunstein 
2006). 
There is mounting evidence that this assump-
tion is incorrect. It includes observational studies 
that demonstrate that science literacy, numeracy, 
and education (Kahan 2015; Kahan et al. 2012; 
Hamilton 2012; Hamilton 2011)—all of which it is 
plausible to see as elements or outgrowths of the 
critical reasoning capacities associated with System 2 
information processing—are associated with more, 
not less, political division of the kind one would 
expect if individuals were engaged in motivated rea-
soning. 
Experimental evidence points in the same direc-
tion. Individuals who score higher on the Cognitive 
Reflection Test, for example, have shown an even 
stronger tendency than ones who score lower to 
credit evidence selectively in patterns that affirm 
their political outlooks (Kahan 2013). The evidence 
being assessed in that study was nonquantitative but 
involved a degree of complexity that was likely to 
obscure its ideological implications from subjects 
inclined to engage the information in a casual or 
heuristic fashion. The greater polarization of sub-
jects who scored highest on the CRT was consistent 
with the inference that individuals more disposed to 
engage systematically with information would be 
more likely to discern the political significance of it 
and would use their critical reasoning capacities se-
lectively to affirm or reject it conditional on its con-
geniality to their political outlooks. 
The experimental results we report in this paper 
display the same interaction between motivated 
cognition and System 2 information processing. The 
numeracy scale predicts how likely individuals are to 
resort to more systematic as opposed to heuristic 
engagement with quantitative information essential to 
valid causal inference. The results in the gun-ban 
conditions suggest that high numeracy subjects 
made use of this System 2 reasoning capacity selec-
tively in a pattern consistent their motivation to 
form a politically congenial interpretation of the 
results of the gun-ban experiment.  This outcome is 
consistent with that of scholars who see both sys-
tematic (or System 2) and heuristic (System 1) rea-
soning as vulnerable to motivated cognition (Cohen 
2003; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken 1997;  Chen, Duck-
worth & Chaiken 1999). (Seems a little repetitive) 
These findings also bear on whether ideologi-
cally motivated cognition is usefully described as a 
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manifestation of “bounded rationality.” Cognitive 
biases associated with System 1 reasoning are typi-
cally characterized that way on the ground that they 
result from over-reliance on heuristic patterns of 
information processing that reflect generally adap-
tive but still demonstrably inferior substitutes for 
the more effortful and more reliable type of infor-
mation processing associated with System 2 reason-
ing (e.g., Kahneman 2003; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler 
1998). 
We submit that a form of information pro-
cessing cannot reliably be identified as “irrational,” 
“subrational,” “boundedly rational” or the like in-
dependent of what an individuals’ aims are in mak-
ing use of information (Baron 2008, p. 61). It is per-
fectly rational, from an individual-welfare perspective, for 
individuals to engage decision-relevant science in a 
manner that promotes culturally or politically con-
genial beliefs. What any individual member of the 
public thinks about the reality of climate change, the 
hazards of nuclear waste disposal, or the efficacy of 
gun control is too inconsequential to influence the 
risk that that person or anyone he or she cares 
about faces. Nevertheless, given what positions on 
these issues signify about a person’s defining com-
mitments, forming a belief at odds with the one that 
predominates on it within important affinity groups 
of which such a person is a member could expose 
him or her to an array of highly unpleasant conse-
quences (Kahan 2012) Forms of information pro-
cessing that reliably promote the stake individuals 
have in conveying their commitment to identity-
defining groups can thus be viewed as manifesting 
what Anderson (1993) and others (Cohen 2003; 
Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Hillman 2010; Lessig 
1995; Stanovich 2013) have described as expressive 
rationality.  
If ideologically motivated reasoning is expres-
sively rational, then we should expect those individ-
uals who display the highest reasoning capacities to 
be the ones most powerfully impelled to engage in it 
(Kahan et al. 2012). This study now joins the rank 
of a growing list of others that fit this expectation 
and that thus supports the interpretation that ideo-
logically motivated reasoning is not a form of 
bounded rationality but instead a sign of how it be-
comes rational for otherwise intelligent people to 
use their critical faculties when they find themselves 
in the unenviable situation of having to choose be-
tween crediting the best available evidence or simply 
being who they are. 
6. Conclusion: Protecting the “sci-
ence-communication environ-
ment” 
To conclude that ideologically motivated rea-
soning is expressively rational obviously does not 
imply that it is socially or morally desirable (Lessig 
1995). Indeed, the implicit conflation of individual 
rationality and collective wellbeing has long been 
recognized to be a recipe for confusion, one that 
not only distorts inquiry into the mechanisms of 
individual decisionmaking but also impedes the 
identification of social institutions that remove any 
conflict between those mechanisms and attainment 
of the public good (Olson 1965). Accounts that 
misunderstand the expressive rationality of ideolog-
ically motivated cognition are unlikely to generate 
reliable insights into strategies for counteracting the 
particular threat that persistent political conflict 
over decision-relevant science poses to enlightened 
democratic policymaking. 
Commentators who subscribe to what we have 
called the Science Comprehension Thesis typically 
propose one of two courses of action. The first is to 
strengthen science education and the teaching of 
critical reasoning skills, in order better to equip the 
public for the cognitive demands of democratic citi-
zenship in a society where technological risk is be-
coming an increasingly important focus of public 
policymaking (Miller & Pardo 2000). The second is 
to dramatically shrink the scope of the public’s role 
in government by transferring responsibility for risk 
regulation and other forms of science-informed pol-
icymaking to politically insulated expert regulators 
(Breyer 1993). This is the program advocated by 
commentators who believe that the public’s overre-
liance on heuristic-driven forms of reasoning is too 
elemental to human psychology be corrected by any 
form of education (Sunstein 2005).  
Because it rejects the empirical premise of the 
Science Comprehension Thesis, the Identity-
protective Cognition Thesis takes issue with both of 
these prescriptions. The reason that citizens remain 
divided over risks in the face of compelling and 
widely accessible scientific evidence, this account 
suggests, is not that that they are insufficiently ra-
tional; it is that the that they are too rational in ex-
tracting from information on these issues the evi-
dence that matters most for them in their everyday 
lives. In an environment in which positions on par-
ticular policy-relevant facts become widely under-
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stood as symbols of individuals’ membership in and 
loyalty to opposing cultural groups, it will promote 
people’s individual interests to attend to evidence 
about those facts in a manner that reliably conforms 
their beliefs to the ones that predominate in the 
groups they are members of. Indeed, the tendency 
to process information in this fashion will be 
strongest among individuals who display the reason-
ing capacities most strongly associated with science 
comprehension.  
Thus, improving public understanding of sci-
ence and propagating critical reasoning skills—while 
immensely important, both intrinsically and practi-
cally (Dewey 1910)—cannot be expected to dissi-
pate persistent public conflict over decision-relevant 
science. Only removing the source of the motiva-
tion to process scientific evidence in an identity-
protective fashion can. The conditions that generate 
symbolic associations between positions on risk and 
like facts, on the one hand, and cultural identities, 
on the other, must be neutralized in order to assure 
that citizens make use of their capacity for science comprehen-
sion.2 
In a deliberative environment protected from 
the entanglement of cultural meanings and policy-
relevant facts, moreover, there is little reason to 
assume that ordinary citizens will be unable to make 
an intelligent contribution to public policymaking. 
The amount of decision-relevant science that indi-
viduals reliably make use of in their everyday lives 
far exceeds what any of them (even scientists, par-
ticularly when acting outside of the domain of their 
particular specialty) are capable of understanding on 
                                                     
2 We would add, however, that we do not believe that the re-
sults of this or any other study we know of rule out the exist-
ence of cognitive dispositions that do effectively mitigate the 
tendency to display ideologically motivated reasoning. Research 
on the existence of such dispositions is ongoing and important 
(Baron 1995; Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen, 2012). Existing 
research, however, suggests that the incidence of any such dis-
position in the general population is small and is distinct from 
the forms of critical reasoning disposition—ones associated 
with constructs such as science literacy, cognitive reflection, and 
numeracy—that are otherwise indispensable to science com-
prehension. In addition, we submit that the best current under-
standing of the study of science communication indicates that 
the low incidence of this capacity, if it exists, is not the source 
of persistent conflict over decision-relevant science. Individuals 
endowed with perfectly ordinary capacities for comprehending 
science can be expected reliably to use them to identify the best 
available scientific evidence so long as risks and like policy-
relevant facts are shielded from antagonistic cultural meanings. 
an expert level. They are able to accomplish this feat 
because they are experts at something else: identify-
ing who knows what about what (Keil 2010), a form 
of rational processing of information that features 
consulting others whose basic outlooks individuals 
share and whose knowledge and insights they can 
therefore reliably gauge (Kahan et al. 2010).  
These normal and normally reliable processes 
of knowledge transmission break down when risk 
or like facts are transformed (whether through stra-
tegic calculation or misadventure and accident) into 
divisive symbols of cultural identity. The solution to 
this problem is not—or certainly not necessarily!—to 
divest citizens of the power to contribute to the 
formation of public policy. It is to adopt measures 
that effectively shield decision-relevant science from 
the influences that generate this reason-disabling 
state (Kahan et al. 2006). 
Just as individual well-being depends on the 
quality of the natural environment, so the collective 
welfare of democracy depends on the quality of a 
science communication environment hospitable to the ex-
ercise of the ordinarily reliable reasoning faculties 
that ordinary citizens use to discern what is collec-
tively known. Identifying strategies for protecting 
the science communication environment from an-
tagonistic cultural meanings—and for decontami-
nating it when such protective measures fail—is the 
most critical contribution that decision science can 
make to the practice of democratic government. 
Acknowledgement. Research for this paper was 
funded by the National Science Foundation, Grant 
SES 0922714 and the Cultural Cognition Lab at 
Yale Law School. We are indebted to Angie John-
ston, Scott Johnson, Matthew Fisher, Andrew Mey-
er, and Maggie Wittlin for discussion and com-
ments. Correspondence concerning this article 
should be addressed to Dan M. Kahan, Yale Law 
School, PO Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520. 
Email: dan.kahan@yale.edu. 
References 
 
Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. Interaction terms in logit 
and probit models. Economics Letters 80(1), 123-
129 (2003). 
Akerlof, G.A. & Kranton, R.E. Economics and 
identity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 
715-753 (2000). 
Behavioural Public Policy  18 
Anderson, E. Value in ethics and economics. 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.; 
1993). 
Baron, J. Myside bias in thinking about abortion. 
Thinking & Reasoning, 1, 221-235 (1995). 
Baron, J. Thinking and deciding (Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, New York, 2008). 
Cohen, G.L. Party over Policy: The Dominating 
Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs. 
J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 85, 808-822 (2003). 
Cohen, J. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behav-
ioral Sciences. (Lawrence Earlbaum Assocs., 
Hillsdale, NJ; 1988). 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S.G. & Aiken, L.S. 
Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Anal-
ysis for the Behavioral Sciences, Edn. 3rd. (L. 
Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, N.J.; 2003). 
Dawson, E., Gilovich, T. & Regan, D.T. Motivated 
Reasoning and Performance on the was on Se-
lection Task. Personality and Social Psychology Bulle-
tin 28, 1379-1387 (2002). 
Dawson, E., Gilovich, T. & Regan, D.T. Motivated 
Reasoning and Susceptibility to the “Cell A” Bi-
as. Unpublished manuscript (2000). 
Dewey, J. Science as Subject-Matter and as Meth-
od. Science 31, 121-127 (1910). 
Gastil, J., Braman, D., Kahan, D. & Slovic, P. The 
Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion. 
PS: Political Science & Politics 44, 711-714 (2011). 
Giner-Sorolla, R. & Chaiken, S. Selective Use of 
Heuristic and Systematic Processing Under De-
fense Motivation. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 23, 84-97 (1997). 
Greene, W. Testing hypotheses about interaction 
terms in nonlinear models. Economics Letters 
107(2), 291-296 (2010). 
Hillman, A.L. Expressive behavior in economics 
and politics. European Journal of Political Economy 
26, 403-418 (2010). 
Jolls, C., Sunstein, C.R. & Thaler, R. A Behavioral 
Approach to Law & Economics. Stan. L. Rev. 
50, 1471 (1998). 
Jost, J. T., Hennes, E. P., & Lavine, H. (in press). 
“Hot” political cognition: Its self-, group-, and 
system-serving purposes. In D. E. Carlson 
(Ed.), Oxford handbook of social cognition. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kahan, D. Fixing the Communications Failure. 
Nature 463, 296-297 (2010). 
Kahan, D.M. Climate-Science Communication and 
the Measurement Problem. Advances in Political 
Psychology 36, 1-43 (2015). 
Kahan, D. Politically nonpartisan folks are cultural-
ly polarized on climate change. CCP Blog (June 
21, 2012). 
Kahan, D. Why we are poles apart on climate 
change. Nature 488, 255 (2012). 
Kahan, D. WSMD? JA!, episode 3: It turns out that 
Independents are as just partisan in cognition as 
Democrats & Republicans after all!, CCP Blog, 
(Dec., 12, 2012) 
Kahan, D., Braman, D., Cohen, G., Gastil, J. & 
Slovic, P. Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who 
Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of 
the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition. Law and 
Human Behavior 34, 501-516 (2010). 
Kahan, D.M. Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and 
Cognitive Reflection. Judgment and Decision Mak-
ing 8, 407-424 (2013). 
Kahan, D.M. Cultural Cognition as a Conception 
of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in Handbook of 
Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, 
Ethics and Social Implications of Risk. (eds. R. 
Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, S. Roeser & M. Peter-
son) 725-760 (Springer London, Limited, 2012). 
Kahan, D.M. The Supreme Court 2010 Term—
Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cogni-
tion, and Some Problems for Constitutional 
Law Harv. L. Rev. 126, 1- (2011). 
Kahan, D.M., Braman, D., Gastil, J., Slovic, P. & 
Mertz, C.K. Culture and Identity-Protective 
Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in 
Risk Perception. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 
4, 465-505 (2007). 
Kahan, D.M., Braman, D., Monahan, J., Callahan, 
L. & Peters, E. Cultural Cognition and Public 
Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment 
Laws L. & Human Behavior 34, 118-140 (2010). 
Kahan, D.M., Jenkins-Smith, H. & Braman, D. 
Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus. J. 
Risk Res. 14, 147-174 (2011). 
Behavioural Public Policy  19 
Kahan, D.M., Peters, E., Wittlin, M., Slovic, P., 
Ouellette, L.L., Braman, D. & Mandel, G. The 
polarizing impact of science literacy and numer-
acy on perceived climate change risks. Nature 
Climate Change 2, 732-735 (2012). 
Kahan, D.M., Slovic, P., Braman, D. & Gastil, J. 
Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of 
Sunstein on Risk. Harvard Law Review 119, 1071-
1109 (2006). 
Kahneman, D. Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psy-
chology for Behavioral Economics. American 
Economic Review 93, 1449-1475 (2003). 
Keil, F.C. The Feasibility of Folk Science. Cognitive 
science 34, 826-862 (2010). 
King, G., Tom, M. & Wittenberg., J. Making the 
Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Inter-
pretation and Presentation. Am. J. Pol. Sci 44, 
347-361 (2000). 
Kunda, . (1990) The Case for Motivated Reason-
ing. Psychological Bulletin 108, 480-498. 
Lavine, H., Johnston, C. D., & Steenbergen, M. R. 
(2012). The ambivalent partisan : how critical loyalty 
promotes democracy. New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Lessig, L. The Regulation of Social Meaning. U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 62, 943-1045 (1995). 
Liberali, J.M., Reyna, V.F., Furlan, S., Stein, L.M. & 
Pardo, S.T. Individual Differences in Numeracy 
and Cognitive Reflection, with Implications for 
Biases and Fallacies in Probability Judgment. 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 25, 361-381 
(2012). 
Lodge, M. & Taber, C.S. The rationalizing voter 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New 
York, 2013). 
Loewenstein, G.F., Weber, E.U., Hsee, C.K. & 
Welch, N. Risk as Feelings. Psychological Bulletin 
127, 267-287 (2001). 
Marx, S.M., Weber, E.U., Orlove, B.S., Leiser-
owitz, A., Krantz, D.H., Roncoli, C. and Phil-
lips, J. (2007) Communication and mental pro-
cesses: Experiential and analytic processing of 
uncertain climate information. Global Environ-
mental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions 17(1), 
47-58. 
McCaffrey, M.S. and Buhr, S.M. (2008) Clarifying 
climate confusion: addressing systemic holes, 
cognitive gaps, and misconceptions through 
climate literacy. Physical Geography 29(6), 512-
528. 
McCright, A.M. & Dunlap, R.E. Bringing ideology 
in: the conservative white male effect on worry 
about environmental problems in the USA. 
Journal of Risk Research 16, 211-226 (2013). 
Miller, J.D. & Pardo, R. in Between understanding 
and trust: The public, science and technology. 
(eds. M. Dierkes & C.v. Grote) 131-156 (Har-
wood Academic, Australia: 2000). 
Olson, M. The logic of collective action; public 
goods and the theory of groups. (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, Mass.,; 1965). 
Pampel, F.C. Logistic regression : a primer (Sage Publi-
cations, Thousand Oaks, Calif., 2000). 
Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mert, C.K., 
Maocco, K. & Dickert, S. Numeracy and Deci-
sion Making. Psychological Science 17, 407-413 
(2006). 
Powers, E. A. Interpreting logit regressions with 
interaction terms: an application to the man-
agement turnover literature. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 11(3), 504-522 (2005). 
Rosenau, J. Science denial: a guide for scientists. 
Trends in microbiology 20, 567-569 (2012). Weber, 
E.U. & Stern, P.C. Public Understanding of 
Climate Change in the United States. Am. Psy-
chologist 66, 315-328 (2011). 
Rubin, D.B. Multiple imputation for nonresponse 
in surveys. (Wiley, New York; 1987). 
Sherman, D.K. & Cohen, G.L. in Advances in Ex-
perimental Social Psychology, Vol. 38 183-242 
(Academic Press, 2006). 
Smith, E.R. in Handbook of Research Methods in 
Social and Personality Psychology (eds. H.T. 
Reis & C.M. Judd) 17-39 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 2000). 
Stanovich, K.E. & West, R.F. Who uses base rates 
and P (D|H)? An analysis of individual differ-
ences. Memory & Cognition 26, 161-179 (1998). 
Stanovich, K.E. and West, R.F. (2000) Individual 
differences in reasoning: Implications for the 
Behavioural Public Policy  20 
rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
23(5), 645-665. 
Stanovich, K.E. What Intelligence Tests Miss : The 
Psychology of Rational Thought. (Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven; 2009). 
Stanovich, K.E. Why humans are (sometimes) less 
rational than other animals: Cognitive com-
plexity and the axioms of rational choice. Think-
ing & Reasoning 19, 1-26 (2013). 
Stanovich, K.E., West, R.F. & Toplak, M.E. in The 
science of reason : a Festschrift for Jonathan St. 
B.T Evans. (eds. J.S.B.T. Evans, K.I. Mankte-
low, D.E. Over & S. Elqayam) 355-396 (Psy-
chology Press, New York, NY; 2011). 
Streiner, D.L. Unicorns Do Exist: A Tutorial on 
“Proving” the Null Hypothesis. Canadian Journal 
of Psychiatry 48, 756-761 (2003).  
Sunstein, C.R. Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precau-
tionary Principle. (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK ; New York; 2005). 
Sunstein, C.R. Misfearing: A Reply. Harvard Law 
Review 119, 1110-1125 (2006). 
Sunstein, C.R. On the Divergent American Reac-
tions to Terrorism and Climate Change. Colum-
bia Law Review 107, 503-557 (2007). 
Sunstein, C.R. What's Available? Social Influences 
and Behavioral Economics. Nw. L. Rev. 97 
(2003). 
Toplak, M., West, R. and Stanovich, K. (2011) The 
Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of per-
formance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. Memory 
& Cognition 39(7), 1275-1289. 
Wasserman, E.A., Dorner, W.W. and Kao, S.F. 
(1990) Contributions of Specific Cell Infor-
mation to Judgments of Interevent Contingen-
cy. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition 16(3), 509-521. 
Watts, D.J. Everything is Obvious: Once You 
Know the Answer: How Common Sense Fails. 
(Atlantic Books, 2011). 
Weber, E. Experience-Based and Description-
Based Perceptions of Long-Term Risk: Why 
Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (yet). Cli-
matic Change 77, 103-120 (2006). 
Weber, E.U. & Stern, P.C. Public Understanding 
of Climate Change in the United States. Am. 
Psychologist 66, 315-328 (2011). 
Weller, J.A., Dieckmann, N.F., Tusler, M., Mertz, 
C., Burns, W.J. & Peters, E. Development and 
testing of an abbreviated numeracy scale: A 
rasch analysis approach. Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making 26, 198-212 (2012). 
Westen, D., Blagov, P.S., Harenski, K., Kilts, C. & 
Hamann, S. Neural Bases of Motivated Reason-
ing: An fMRI Study of Emotional Constraints 
on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. 
Presidential Election. Journal of Cognitive Neu-
roscience 18, 1947-1958 (2006). 
  
Behavioural Public Policy  21 
Appendix A. Statistical Appendix 
 
This appendix furnishes information on the 
multivariate regression model used to test the study 
hypotheses. 
1. Statistical power and missing data 
Because it pits opposing ICT and SCT hypoth-
eses against one another, the study design contem-
plated the possibility of drawing inferences from the 
absence of an effect (decreased or increased polari-
zation among high numeracy subjects in the gun-
ban conditions). The strength of inferences drawn 
from “null” findings depends heavily on statistical 
power. The large size of the sample furnished ade-
quate power to detect even small effect sizes (e.g., r 
= .10) with a probability well over .80 at p ≤ .05 
(Cohen 1988). As a result, findings of nonsignifi-
cance could be equated with lack of effect with low 
risk of Type II error (Streiner 2003). To assure full 
exploitation of the power associated with the large 
sample see, missing data were replaced by multiple 
imputation (King et al. 2001; Rubin 2004). 
2. The model  
The regression model is a logistic regression, 
which is appropriate for assessing the probability of 
a binary outcome (Cohen et al. 2003)—here, cor-
rectly responding to the covariance detection prob-
lem. The goal of the model is to determine whether 
and to what extent numeracy influences the proba-
bility that a subject will answer the problem correct-
ly conditional on his or her level of numeracy, his or 
her political outlooks, and the experimental condi-
tion to which he or she was assigned.  Model varia-
bles thus included ones for those predictors, plus 
cross-product terms suited for assessing their inter-
action with one another (Cohen et al. 2003, p. 494). 
We entered the relevant variables in stages. The 
aim of the initial two was to determine what portion 
of the variance in the probability of answering cor-
rectly could be attributed solely to numeracy and 
the experimental assignments independently of sub-
jects’ political outlooks.  The scatter plots (Figure 4-
Figure 6) suggested that the impact of numeracy on 
subjects’ ability to identify the correct response in 
the covariance-detection problem was not linear but 
triggered at a threshold between the 75th and 90th 
percentiles (five and seven answers correct) on the 
numeracy scale. The scatter plots also suggested that 
the impact of numeracy in improving the perfor-
mance of subjects was uneven across the skin-
treatment and gun-control conditions, a result con-
sistent with the hypothesis that ideologically moti-
vated reasoning would inhibit effortful processing 
of information in conditions in which heuristic 
strategies for assessing the data affirmed subjects’ 
political outlooks. Consistent with these patterns, 
we found that a quadratic model—one that as-
sumed that numeracy’s impact on identifying the 
data would be curvilinear and vary across each con-
dition (Pampel 2000, p. 20)—fit the data better than 
a model that assumed numeracy’s contribution 
would be linear and invariant across each condition 
(Table A1, Stages 1-2).  
After identifying the best-fitting model based 
only on subject numeracy and political outlooks, we 
added terms designed to test whether the impact of 
Numeracy on subject performance was conditional 
on their political outlooks. Two-way interaction 
terms that reflected the impact of political outlooks 
in each condition, and three-way ones that reflected 
how the impact of numeracy varied in each condi-
tion in relation to subjects’ political outlooks, also 
improved the fit of the model. The additional of 
these variables also improved the fit of the model 
(Table A1, Stage 3).  Adding three-way interaction 
terms to reflect the impact of Numeracy2 and politi-
cal outlooks did not improve model fit. 
The model defies does not admit of ready ex-
plication based on the regression output alone. 
Models containing multiple two- and three-way in-
teraction terms frequently defy straightforward in-
terpretation, particularly in logistic regression, where 
the impact that such terms have cannot be deter-
mined simply by examining their sign and signifi-
cance (Ai & Norton, 2003).  The only reliable way 
to determine the effect of such predictors is to cal-
culate their marginal impact on the outcome varia-
ble as one varies the values of the predictors in a 
manner that corresponds to hypotheses of interest 
(Greene, 2010; Powers, 2005). Such an analysis ap-
pears in section 4.2 of the text. 
Advances in Political Psychology   
 
 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
numeracy 0.11 (0.78) 0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (-0.05) 
rash_decreases 0.36 (1.91) 0.36 (1.42) 0.40 (1.57) 
rash_increases -0.12 (-0.63) 0.01 (0.02) 0.06 (0.22) 
crime_increases 0.64 (3.46) 1.03 (4.06) 1.07 (4.02) 
numeracy x rash_decreases 0.19 (0.95) 0.21 (1.00) 0.23 (1.05) 
numeracy x rash_increases 0.50 (2.17) 0.51 (2.29) 0.55 (2.29) 
numeracy x crime_increases 0.26 (1.26) 0.38 (1.79) 0.46 (2.01) 
numeracy2 
  
0.32 (2.77) 0.31 (2.46) 
numeracy2 x rash_decreases 
  
0.01 (0.08) 0.02 (0.14) 
numeracy2 x rash_increases 
  
-0.09 (-0.49) -0.07 (-0.39) 
numeracy2x crime_increases 
  
-0.39 (-2.39) -0.31 (-1.75) 
Conserv_Repub 
    
-0.64 (-3.95) 
Conserv_Repub x rash_decreases 
    
0.56 (2.64) 
Conserv_Repub x rash_increases 
    
0.63 (2.82) 
Conserv_Repub x crime_increases 
    
1.28 (6.02) 
numeracy x Conserv_Repub 
    
-0.33 (-1.89) 
numeracy x Conserv_Repub x rash_decreases 
   
0.33 (1.40) 
numeracy x Conserv_Repub x rash_increases 
   
0.26 (1.08) 
numeracy x Conserv_Repub x crime_increases 
   
0.54 (2.17) 
constant -0.58 (-4.06) -0.91 (-4.64) -0.96 (-4.70) 
F-test (7, 1102) 6.46 (11, 1098) 5.78 (19, 1090) 5.06 
Δ F-test 
  
(4, 1105) 5.20 (8, 1101) 5.21 
Table A1. Multivariate regression analysis. N = 1111. Outcome variable is “correct,” a binary variable coded “1” for correctly 
interpreting the data and “0” for incorrectly interpreting it. Predictor estimates are logit coefficients with -test statistic indicated paren-
thetically. “Rash_decreases,” “rash_inreases,” and “crime_increases” are dummy variables reflecting experimental condition assign-
ment (0 = unassigned, 1 = assigned); the reference assignment is to “crime decreases.” Both Conserv_Repub and numeracy are cen-
tered at “0” for ease of interpretation. Bolded typeface indicates predictor coefficient, model F-test, or incremental change in model 
F-test is significant at p < 0.05. 
